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Analytic philosophy (sometimes analytical philosophy) is a style of philosophy that became dominant in English-speaking countries during the 20th century. In the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia, the great majority of university philosophy departments identify themselves as "analytic" departments.〔 "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers. Practitioners of types of philosophizing that are not in the analytic tradition—- such as phenomenology, classical pragmatism, existentialism, or Marxism—- feel it necessary to define their position in relation to analytic philosophy." John Searle (2003) ''Contemporary Philosophy in the United States'' in N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.), ''The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy'', 2nd ed., (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1.〕 The term "analytic philosophy" can refer to: * A philosophical practice〔See, e.g., Avrum Stroll, ''Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy'' (Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 5: "()t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems." Also, see Stroll (2000), p. 7: "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. () ()e are dealing with a family resemblance concept."〕〔See Hans-Johann Glock, ''What Is Analytic Philosophy'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 205: "The answer to the title question, then, is that analytic philosophy is a tradition held together ''both'' by ties of mutual influence ''and'' by family resemblances."〕 characterized by an emphasis on argumentative clarity and precision (often achieved by means of formal logic and analysis of language) and a tendency to use, or refer to, mathematics and the natural sciences.〔Brian Leiter (2006) webpage (''"Analytic" and "Continental" Philosophy'' ). Quote on the definition: "'Analytic' philosophy today names a style of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views. Analytic philosophers, crudely speaking, aim for argumentative clarity and precision; draw freely on the tools of logic; and often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities."〕〔Colin McGinn, ''The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey through Twentieth-Century Philosophy'' (HarperCollins, 2002), p. xi.: "analytical philosophy () too narrow a label, since () is not generally a matter of taking a word or concept and analyzing it (whatever exactly thatthat might be). () This tradition emphasizes clarity, rigor, argument, theory, truth. It is not a tradition that aims primarily for inspiration or consolation or ideology. Nor is it particularly concerned with 'philosophy of life,' though parts of it are. This kind of philosophy is more like science than religion, more like mathematics than poetry – though it is neither science nor mathematics."〕 * The more specific set of developments of early 20th-century philosophy that were the historical antecedents of the current practice: e.g., the work of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, and logical positivists. In this more specific sense, analytic philosophy is identified with specific philosophical traits (many of which are rejected by many contemporary analytic philosophers), such as: * * The logical-positivist principle that there are not any specifically philosophical facts and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. This may be contrasted with the traditional foundationalism, which considers philosophy to be a special science (i.e. the discipline of knowledge) that investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything.〔See Aristotle Metaphysics (Book II 993a), Kenny (1973) p. 230.〕 Consequently, many analytic philosophers have considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. This is an attitude that begins with John Locke, who described his work as that of an "underlabourer" to the achievements of natural scientists such as Newton. During the twentieth century, the most influential advocate of the continuity of philosophy with science was Willard Van Orman Quine.〔See, e.g., Quine's papers "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Epistemology Naturalized".〕 * * The principle that the logical clarification of thoughts can be achieved only by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions.〔A.P. Martinich, "Introduction," in Martinich & D. Sosa (eds.), ''A Companion to Analytic Philosophy'' (Blackwell, 2001), p. 1: "To use a general name for the kind of analytic philosophy practiced during the first half of the twentieth century, () 'conceptual analysis' aims at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components."〕 The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it (often using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system), to reduce it to simpler components if necessary, and to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language.〔Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.111〕 * * The neglect of generalized philosophical systems in favour of more restricted inquiries stated rigorously,〔Scott Soames, ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century'' Vol. 1 (Princeton UP, 2003), p. xv: "There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance. What distinguishes twentieth-century analytical philosophy from at least some philosophy in other traditions, or at other times, is not a categorical rejection of philosophical systems, but rather the acceptance of a wealth of smaller, more thorough and more rigorous, investigations that need not be tied to any overarching philosophical view." See also, e.g., "Philosophical Analysis" (catalogued under "Analysis, Philosophical") in ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' , Vol. 1 (Macmillan, 1967), ''esp.'' sections on "Bertrand Russell" at p. 97''ff'', "G.E. Moore" at p. 100''ff'', and "Logical Positivism" at p. 102''ff''.〕 or ordinary language.〔See, e.g., the works of G.E. Moore and J.L. Austin.〕 According to a characteristic paragraph by Russell:
Analytic philosophy is often understood in contrast to other philosophical traditions, most notably continental philosophies such as existentialism and phenomenology, and also Thomism, Indian philosophy, and Marxism.〔A.C. Grayling (ed.), ''Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject'' (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 2: "Analytic philosophy is mainly associated with the contemporary English-speaking world, but it is by no means the only important philosophical tradition. In this volume two other immensely rich and important such traditions are introduced: Indian philosophy, and philosophical thought in Europe from the time of Hegel." L.J. Cohen, ''The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy'' (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 5: "So, despite a few overlaps, analytical philosophy is not difficult to distinguish broadly () from other modern movements, like phenomenology, say, or existentialism, or from the large amount of philosophizing that has also gone on in the present century within frameworks deriving from other influential thinkers like Aquinas, Hegel, or Marx." H.-J. Glock, ''What Is Analytic Philosophy?'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 86: "Most non-analytic philosophers of the twentieth century do not belong to continental philosophy."〕 ==History== Late 19th-century English philosophy was dominated by British idealism, as taught by philosophers like F. H. Bradley and Thomas Hill Green. It was with reference to this intellectual basis that the initiators of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, articulated early analytic philosophy. Since its beginning, a basic principle of analytic philosophy has been conceptual clarity,〔Mautner, Thomas (editor) (2005) ''The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy'', entry for 'Analytic philosophy'', pp.22–3〕 in the name of which Moore and Russell rejected Hegelianism, which they accused of obscurity.〔See for example Moore's ''A Defence of Common Sense'' and Russell's critique of the Doctrine of internal relations,〕〔"Analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-Hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings." 〕 Inspired by developments of modern logic, the early Russell claimed that the problems of philosophy can be solved by showing the simple constituents of complex notions.〔 An important aspect of British idealism was logical holism—- the opinion that the aspects of the world cannot be known wholly without also knowing the whole world. This is closely related to the opinion that relations between items are actually ''internal relations'', that is, properties internal to the nature of those items. Russell, along with Wittgenstein, in response promulgated logical atomism and the doctrine of ''external relations''—- the belief that the world consists of ''independent'' facts.〔Baillie, James, "Introduction to Bertrand Russell" in ''Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Second Edition'' (Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 25.〕 Russell, during his early career, along with his collaborator Alfred North Whitehead, was much influenced by Gottlob Frege, who developed predicate logic, which allowed a much greater range of sentences to be parsed into logical form than was possible using the ancient Aristotelian logic. Frege was also an influential philosopher of mathematics in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. In contrast to Husserl's 1891 book ''Philosophie der Arithmetik'', which attempted to show that the concept of the cardinal number derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them, Frege sought to show that mathematics and logic have their own validity, independent of the judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians (which were the basis of arithmetic according to the "psychologism" of Husserl's ''Philosophie''). Frege further developed his philosophy of logic and mathematics in ''The Foundations of Arithmetic'' and ''The Basic Laws of Arithmetic'' where he provided an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number. Like Frege, Russell attempted to show that mathematics is reducible to logical fundamentals in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). Later, his book written with Whitehead, ''Principia Mathematica'' (1910–13), encouraged many philosophers to renew their interest with the development of symbolic logic. Additionally, Russell adopted Frege's predicate logic as his primary philosophical method, a method Russell thought could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. For example, the English word "is" has three distinct meanings which can be parsed in predicate logic as the following: * For the sentence 'the cat ''is'' asleep', the ''is'' of predication means that "x is P" (denoted as P(x)) * For the sentence 'there ''is'' a cat', the ''is'' of existence means that "there is an x" (∃x); * For the sentence 'three ''is'' half of six', the ''is'' of identity means that "x is the same as y" (x=y). Russell sought to resolve various philosophical problems by applying such logical distinctions, most famously in his analysis of definite descriptions in "On Denoting." 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Analytic philosophy」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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